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APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF REVOCATION BY
DIVORCE TO LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
The Uniform Probate Code states: "If after executing a will the
testator is divorced or his marriage annulled, the divorce.., revokes
any disposition or appointment of property made by the will to the
former spouse .... 1 Forty-four states have similar revocation-by-
divorce statutes.2
The revocation statutes recognize that "[d]ivorce usually repre-
sents a stormy parting, where the last thing one of the parties wishes
is to have an earlier will carried out giving everything to a former
1 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-508 (1982). Section 2-508 states in full:
If after executing a will the testator is divorced or his marriage an-
nulled, the divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or appointment
of property made by the will to the former spouse, any provision confer-
ring a general or special power of appointment on the former spouse,
and any nomination of the former spouse, as executor, trustee, conserva-
tor, or guardian, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. Property
prevented from passing to a former spouse because of revocation by di-
vorce or annulment passes as if the former spouse failed to survive the
decedent, and other provisions conferring some power or office on the
former spouse are interpreted as if the spouse failed to survive the dece-
dent. If provisions are revoked solely by this section, they are revived by
testator's remarriage to the former spouse. For purposes of this section,
divorce or annulment means any divorce or annulment which would ex-
clude the spouse as a surviving spouse within the meaning of Section 2-
802(b). A decree of separation which does not terminate the status of
husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section. No change
in circumstances other than as described in this section revokes a will.
2 ALA. CODE § 2-508 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.185 (1985); ARZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2508 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-25-109(a)(2) (1987); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6122 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-508 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN.§ 45-162 (West 1981); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 209 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.507 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-76 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 560:2-
508 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-508 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 4-7(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-8 (Burns 1972); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 633.271 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-610 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 2-508 (1980); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-105 (1974 & Supp. 1987);
MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 9 (West 1981); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 700.124
(West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-508 (West 1975); Mo. REV STAT. § 474.420
(1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-322 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2333 (1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 133.115 (1980); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-14 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-2-508 (1978); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 (McKinney 1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-5.4 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-08 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2107.33 (Anderson 1976 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 114 (1970 &
Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.315 (1983); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2507(2) (Pur-
don 1975); R.I. GEN LAWS § 33-5-9.1 (Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-230 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-102 (1984); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69
(Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-508 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-59 (1987);
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 11.12.050 (1967); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-6 (1987); Wis. STAT.
§ 853.11 (1971); Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-118 (1977).
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spouse." 3 These statutes also recognize that people have difficulty
accepting their own death.4 The statutes reflect the view that the
testator's failure to change his will after divorce is a delay in expres-
sing a changed testamentary intent rather than a continued expres-
sion of that intent.5
Today, the life insurance policy has replaced the will as the
dominant means of wealth transfer at death.6 The logic behind rev-
ocation-by-divorce statutes clearly applies to transfers of wealth by
life insurance policies. "[P]rinciples of construction and presump-
tions of transferors' intent that have been developed in the law of
wills do not apply" to life insurance policies, however, because the
legal system recognizes and gives effect to the formal distinctions
between the two instruments. 7
Part I of this Note outlines the development of the doctrine of
revocation by divorce from the doctrine of revocation by implica-
tion. It discusses the traditional interpretation and application of
revocation by implication and the subsequent development of revo-
cation-by-divorce statutes. Part II discusses the effect divorce has
on life insurance policies, and evaluates the legal rules that have
prevented courts from extending revocation by divorce to these pol-
icies. Part III demonstrates the practical similarity between wills
and life insurance policies, and Part IV criticizes the courts for deny-
ing the protection of intent the owners of life insurance that the rev-
ocation-by-divorce statutes provide to testators. Finally, the Note
concludes that courts and legislatures should abandon the formalis-
tic distinctions between wills and life insurance policies and extend
the application of revocation-by-divorce statutes to life insurance
policies.
3 Young, Probate Change, 20 BOSTON B.J., Dec. 1976, at 6, 10.
4 See S. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death (1915), in 4 COLLECTED PA-
PERS 304-05 (1925) ("Our own death is indeed unimaginable, and whenever we make
the attempt to imagine it we can perceive that we really survive as spectators. Hence ...
at bottom no one believes in his own death, or to put the same thing in another way, in
the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his own immortality.").
5 See id.; see also Note, Implied Revocation of Wills after Divorce and Property Settlement, 4
DUKE BJ. 122, 126 (1954) (authored by Gary S. Stein) ("[I]n the vast majority of cases
the testator's failure to revoke his will subsequent to divorce is due to neglect, and that
to find an implied revocation usually gives effect to a testator's real intentions.").
6 See Kimball, The Functions of Designations of Beneficiaries in Modern Life Insurance:
U.S.A., in LIFE INSURANCE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 74, 76 (J. Hellner & G.
Nord eds. 1967) ("In view of the numbers of people involved, the life insurance benefici-
ary designation is the principal 'last will and testament' of our legal system.").
7 Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1108, 1136 (1984).
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I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVOCATION BY DIVORCE
A. Revocation by Implication
The law of wills has historically allowed the revocation of a will
by implication when a testator experienced certain changes in cir-
cumstances after executing his will.8 At common law, two changes
in circumstances revoked a testator's will by implication. 9 For a fe-
male, marriage after the creation of a will (marriage of afeme sole) '0
revoked the will. For a male, marriage and birth of issue after the
creation of a will served to revoke the will."
Eventually the Wills Act 12 nullified the doctrine of revocation
by implication in England. In the United States, however, a number
of states specifically incorporated the doctrine into their probate
statutes.' 3 In these states, courts continued to recognize and apply
the doctrine. These courts expanded the scope of revocation by im-
plication to apply to other changes of circumstances.
8 Durfee, Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circumstances of the
Testator, 40 MICH. L. REV. 406, 406 (1942) ("Among the oldest rules in the law of wills
are those by which a will is held to be revoked by implication by certain changes in
circumstances of the testator.").
9 Graunke & Beuscher, The Doctrine of Implied Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change
in Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5 Wis. L. REV. 387, 387 (1930).
10 The common law prohibited a married woman either from making or changing a
will. Id. at 388-89. The will in force at the time of her marriage would thus have dic-
tated the disposition of a woman's property. Common law judges who believed in the
ambulatory nature of wills refused to accept such a result. Id. ("[T]o say that the will of a
feme sole was to remain in effect... would deprive the will of its ambulatory nature, that
characteristic . . . which the [common law] courts . . . have always held to be so
essential.").
11 Initially the doctrine of revocation by implication was rebuttable. See, e.g., Talbot
v. Talbot, 1 Hagg. 705, 711, 162 Eng. Rep. 725, 728 (Eccl. 1828) ("marriage and birth
of issue ... raise an inference that a testator would not adhere to a will made previous to
their existence") (emphasis added); Graunke & Beuscher, supra note 9, at 393-94 (com-
mon law courts first adopted view that parol evidence was not admissible to rebut testa-
tor's presumed intent; by 1839, ecclesiastical courts had accepted presumption as
irrebuttable); Comment, Wills-Revocation by Divorce-The Doctrine of "Changed Circum-
stances," 34 B.U.L. REV. 395, 396 (1954) (revocation became a rigid rule, regardless of
intent of testator). Courts transformed the doctrine into an irrebuttable rule of law by
stressing the moral obligations that marriage and birth of issue imposed upon the
testator.
12 7 Will. IV & I Vict., ch. 26, § 20 (1937). For a discussion of the history of the
Wills Act, see generally J. DUKMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 183-
98 (3d ed. 1984).
13 Those states were Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In addi-
tion, the doctrine was not excluded by revocation statutes in Maryland, Mississippi and
New Mexico. Graunke & Beuscher, supra note 9, at 404-05; see also Note, supra note 5, at
123 (after enumerating specific ways in which a will could be revoked the statutes stated:
" 'but nothing herein contained shall prevent the revocation implied by law, from subse-
quent changes in the condition of the testator' ").
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B. Judicial Extension of Revocation by Implication to Divorce
The first case to recognize divorce as a change of circumstance
that revoked a testator's previously executed will was Lansing v.
Haynes. 14 In Lansing a childless couple received a divorce eight years
after they had executed mutual wills. The parties entered into a
property agreement whereby the husband conveyed certain prop-
erty to the wife, and she released her interest in the remaining prop-
erty. The husband died two years later without having changed his
will.
Despite the absence of the traditional criteria for applying revo-
cation by implication to a male testator's will,' 5 the court held that
the divorce implicitly revoked the will. 16 The court stressed that a
divorce completely destroyed the obligations and duties between a
husband and a wife. 17 In addition, the usual bitterness that accom-
panied a divorce' 8 justified a presumption that the testator would
not have wanted his former wife to take under his will. 19 To hold
otherwise would have been "repugnant to common sense and com-
mon reason."
20
Although the Lansing court attempted to characterize revoca-
tion by divorce as a mere extension of revocation by implication, its
decision strayed from that doctrine's underpinnings. Common law
courts developed revocation by implication because the testator had
acquired new moral obligations as a result of a change in circum-
stances. 21 Courts reasoned that the testator should have accounted
for this change in his will and therefore implied a revocation to ful-
fill his moral obligations.22 Divorce, however, does not create new
moral obligations; rather, it destroys old ones. The court aban-
14 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699 (1893).
15 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
16 Lansing, 95 Mich. at 21, 54 N.W. at 701.
17 Id. at 20, 54 N.W. at 701 ("By the decree of divorce in this case, the parties
became as strangers to each other, and neither owed to the other any obligation or duty
thereafter. There was, therefore, a complete change in these relations ....").
18 Id. at 17, 54 N.W. at 700 ("as is usual in such cases, the feeling between them...
became bitter").
19 Id. at 21, 54 N.W. at 701 ("The natural presumption arising from these changed
relations is the reasonable one, and the one which in law implies a revocation.").
20 Id., 54 N.W. at 701.
21 See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Talbot v. Talbot, 1 Hagg. 705, 711-12, 162 Eng. Rep. 725, 728 (Eccl.
1828) ("[M]arriage and the birth of issue create.., such new obligations and duties, that
... a testator... [would consider] it an act of moral duty to revoke that disposition...
but .. , if there does not arise such a state of circumstances as to produce new duties ...
there is no reason to presume a revocation."); Jones v. Moseley, 40 Miss. 261, 262
(1866) ("These [changes in circumstances] must be such as to produce change, not
merely in testator's affections and feelings, but in his obligations and duties.") (emphasis in
original).
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doned the perceived duty of the testator as a justification for imply-
ing a revocation of his will and focused instead on the testator's
probable intent.23
The conceptual difference between a doctrine based on ac-
quired obligations and one based on eliminated obligations forced
courts to apply revocation by divorce in a somewhat different man-
ner than they had applied revocation by implication. Traditionally,
courts held the testator's entire will revoked and redistributed his
property to fulfill his acquired obligations. 24 The destruction of moral
obligations, however, did not necessarily mean courts should revoke
a testator's entire will. Rather, to maximize consistency with a testa-
tor's probable intent, courts revoked only those dispositions based
on the formerly existing moral duty.25
Courts also struggled to determine when a testator's moral ob-
ligations were eliminated. Despite Lansing's broad language, courts
did not accept the notion that divorce alone revoked a will. 26 In-
stead they focused on the presence of a property settlement be-
tween the two parties. 27 Absent a property settlement, regardless of
the testator's probable intent, 28 divorce alone did not revoke a will
by implication. 29
Although revocation by divorce coupled with a property settle-
23 Lansing, 95 Mich. at 21, 54 N.W. at 701 ("To hold the will unrevoked [where the
parties have been divorced] would be repugnant to that common sense and common
reason upon which law is based.").
24 See, e.g., Lansing, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699; see also supra notes 8-13 and accompa-
nying text.
25 See Baacke v. Baacke, 50 Neb. 18, 23, 69 N.W. 303, 304 (1896) ("The doctrine of
revocation by implication of law is based upon a presumed alteration of intention arising
from the changed.., circumstances of the testator .... [A divorce] could no more than
revoke the will as to [the former spouse's] legacy .... "); see also In re Estate of Battis, 143
Wis. 234, 240, 126 N.W. 9, 12 (1910) ("The changed .. . circumstances of a testator
[brought about by divorce and property settlement] are of a nature, and, in effect, of
such probative force, as to imply that the testator intended that the ... provisions...
made for the wife should become revoked .... ,").
26 See In re Arnold's Estate, 60 Nev. 376, 379, 110 P.2d 204, 205 (194 1) ("The rec-
ord before us presents nothing but a divorce from which an implied revocation may be
inferred. It is not enough."); Comment, supra note 11, at 396 ("In the United States, in
absence of a statute, it is generally agreed that a divorce, unaccompanied by a property
settlement, does not revoke the legacy in favor of the divorced spouse.").
27 See In re Hall's Estate, 106 Minn. 303, 119 N.W. 219 (1909). In this case, the
testator had accused his wife of adultery, but withdrew the charge pursuant to a divorce
agreement. A property settlement gave the wife the value of approximately one-third of
Mr. Hall's property. The court held that the will was revoked. Id. at 307, 119 N.W. at
221-22.
28 See Lansing, 95 Mich. at 21, 54 N.W. at 701.
29 Durfee, supra note 8, at 412 (divorce alone does not revoke the will); Note, supra
note 5, at 122 (absent a statute, divorce alone did not revoke will in favor of ex-spouse).
By requiring a property settlement before allowing divorce to revoke a previously exe-
cuted will, courts have left open the possibility of anomalous results. See, e.g., In re Ar-
nold's Estate, 60 Nev. 376, 110 P.2d 204 (1941) (will not revoked where wife sought no
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
ment was a general rule,30 there were exceptions. Some courts re-
fused to extend revocation by implication to divorce, limiting the
doctrine to its common law applications. 3 1 Some states enumerated
the means of revocation in revocation statutes without specifically
retaining revocation by implication.3 2 In these states, courts some-
times refused to apply the doctrine in deference to the legislature. 33
As a result of these exceptions, the effect of divorce upon a testa-
tor's will was far from uniform among the states prior to the general
adoption of revocation-by-divorce statutes.
C. The Development of Revocation-By-Divorce Statutes
The American Bar Association's Model Probate Code of 1946
provided, "If after making a will the testator is divorced, all provi-
sions in the will in favor of the testator's spouse so divorced are
thereby revoked." 34 At the time the Model Probate Code was
drafted, only three states had revocation-by-divorce statutes. 35 By
the mid-1950s six states had adopted such statutes.36 Today, virtu-
ally every state recognizes revocation by divorce. 37
alimony at time of divorce and property settlement was impossible due to absence of
community property).
30 See Annotation, Divorce as Affecting Will Previously Executed by Husband or Wife, 25
A.L.R. 49, 49 (1923).
31 See, e.g., In re Estate of Brown, 139 Iowa 219, 227, 117 N.W. 260, 263 (1908)
(changes in a testator's circumstances "must be such as would have amounted to a revo-
cation at common law when our statute was enacted."); Hertrais v. Moore, 325 Mass. 57,
61, 88 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1949) (holding that subsequent changes referred to by revoca-
tion statute are confined to those at common law when statute was enacted); In re Bart-
lett's Estate, 108 Neb. 681, 689, 189 N.W. 390, 393 (1922) ("[T]he divorce decree
merely ... satisfied the property rights of the parties as they existed when the divorce
was granted. The fact that Bartlett did not revoke his will in the statutory manner natu-
rally leads to the presumption that he did not intend to revoke it.").
32 Durfee, supra note 8, at 408 ("[T]hirty-four states make no mention of the doc-
trine in their statutes, but provide that no will shall be revoked otherwise than by certain
specified methods, such as burning, cancelling, or by a subsequent will.").
33 See, e.g., Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 136 S.W.2d 278 (1940) (upholding
previously executed will granting one half of husband's property to divorced wife de-
spite cash settlement and wife's release of all interest in husband's property on grounds
that any change in revocation law must be made by legislature).
34 MODEL PROB. CODE § 53 (1946). Although not adopted in full in any state, the
Model Probate Code influenced the probate codes of Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon and Texas. For a
discussion of the Model Probate Code, see Fratcher & Straus, Model Probate Code, 35 PA.
B.A.Q. 206, 207-08 (1964). See also Note, Uniform Probate Code Section 6-201: A Proposal to
Include Stocks and Mutual Funds, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 406-07 n.74 (1987) (authored
by Diane Amado) (discussing history of Uniform Probate Code).
35 MODEL PROB. CODE § 53 comment (1946). The three states were Kansas, Minne-
sota and Washington.
36 See Note, supra note 5, at 123 n.5 (Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Penn-
sylvania, and Washington).
37 See supra note 2.
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Revocation-by-divorce statutes adopt the presumption that "in
the vast majority of cases the testator's failure to revoke his will sub-
sequent to a divorce is due to neglect, and that to find an implied
revocation usually gives effect to a testator's real intentions. ' 38 This
presumption ignores the possibility that, by leaving his will intact, a
divorced testator intends his former spouse to take under the will.
However, man's natural refusal to accept the potential for immedi-
ate death39 and the usual animosity that accompanies divorce40 sup-
port the presumption of intended revocation.
A more significant problem with revocation-by-divorce statutes
is that by adopting a per se rule they inevitably defeat a testator's
intent in some instances. 4 1 In providing for per se revocation, legis-
latures have determined that certainty in the probate process out-
weighs the risks that revocation will nullify a particular testator's
intent.42 Additionally, were legislatures to adopt statutes that cre-
ated a rebuttable presumption of intended revocation, courts would
have to consider extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent at the
time of divorce. Allowing such evidence would invite fraud and
other abuses which would increase the risk that a court would frus-
trate the testator's intent.43
One commentator has argued, "To decide whether it is more
advisable to hold that a divorce revokes a prior will as to the other
spouse or that it does not so revoke, is, of course, a mere guessing
game ... .,,44 Nevertheless, legislatures in the overwhelming major-
ity of states have determined that revocation of a will by divorce is
both reasonable and desirable.45 The logic behind revocation-by-
divorce statutes, however, has been almost universally ignored by
courts and legislatures with respect to life insurance policies.
38 Note, supra note 5, at 126.
39 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
40 See R. NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION 19 (1984) ("Family relationships tend to
arouse our most intense emotions. When a family breaks up other than by mutual
agreement, the parties are often seeking not just a settlement of their legal entitlements;
they are also seeking to punish their spouse ... for years of what they perceive as accu-
mulated wrongs.").
41 Compare In re Perigen, 653 S.W.2d 717 (Tenn. 1983) (holding that where divorce
and property settlement are entered into but never carried out, testator's will is not
revoked by implication) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-102 (1984) (divorce per se revokes
any disposition to former spouse in testator's previously executed will).
42 MODEL PROB. CODE § 53 comment (1946) (grounds for revocation of will due to
changed circumstances should be limited to divorce to minimize uncertainty about the
validity of duly executed will).
43 Note, supra note 5, at 126 ("[Placing] emphasis on the demonstrable probable
intent of the testator,formed after he has executed the will, would probably invite fraud and
perjury.") (emphasis in original).
44 Graunke & Beuscher, supra note 9, at 410-11.




REVOCATION AND LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
Life insurance is an important component of family estate plan-
ning in the United States. In 1986, 85% of American families had
some form of life insurance. Life insurance coverage averaged
$69,100 per family.46 Total industry income exceeded one trillion
dollars. 47 But despite the overwhelming popularity of life insurance
as an estate planning tool, divorce generally does not affect a former
spouse's right to take the proceeds of a life insurance policy.48
However, when the parties enter into a property agreement that
specifically mentions the life insurance policy, some courts have
held that the insured implicitly revoked the designation of his for-
mer spouse as beneficiary.49 Although this rule is facially similar to
the common law revocation standard for wills, its basis is quite dif-
ferent. The following general discussion of life insurance illustrates
the difference between the rules for wills and life insurance policies.
A. The Concept of the Insurable Interest
Life insurance derives its validity from the tenets of contract
law. A life insurance policy is a contract "in which one party agrees
to pay a given sum upon the happening of a particular event contin-
gent upon the duration of human life, in consideration of the imme-
diate payment of a smaller sum or certain equivalent periodical
payments by another." 50 Unlike the typical insurance contract today
in which a person insures his own life, early life insurance policies
were taken out by third parties with the insured concerned only as
the subject of the insurance. 51 Thus, the insurance contract was a
kind of wager between the two contracting parties, with the in-
sured's life as the subject of the bet. In fact, at one time it was com-
46 AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1987 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK UPDATE
6 (1987).
47 Id.
48 Note, Whose Life (Insurance) Is It Anyway? Life Insurance and Divorce in America, 22 J.
FAM. L. 95, 95-96 (1983) (authored by Mark Richardson Brown) (rights of beneficiaries
to receive proceeds of life insurance policy are not affected by divorce).
49 See e.g., Harris v. Brewer, 239 Ark. 614, 617, 390 S.W.2d 630, 632 (1965) ("ap-
pellant is foreclosed to claim any interest or proceeds from the policies she specifically
transferred and released to decedent"); Phillips v. Pelton, 10 Ohio St. 3d 52, 54, 461
N.E.2d 305, 307 (1984) ("[T]he parties specifically directed their attention to the issue
of life insurance and expressed their intention to release all rights which each may have
had as beneficiary.... [T]his language was sufficient to eliminate each party as benefici-
ary... notwithstanding the fact that no specific change of beneficiary was made."). See
generally 5 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 29:4 (rev. ed. 1984) (discussing right of
divorced wife to insurance policy proceeds); infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
50 C. BUNYON, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF LIFE ASSURANCE 17 (1854).




mon for people to take out insurance policies on the lives of public
officials which would pay off if the official died within a specified
period of time.52
To prevent this most vicious type of wagering, the English Par-
liament passed the Gambling Act.53 This act provided that for a
person to conclude a life insurance contract, he had to have an in-
surable interest in the subject of the contract's life.54 In the United
States, a policy holder similarly must have an insurable interest in
the insured's life.55 The United States Supreme Court has defined
insurable interest as "such an interest, arising from the relations of
the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of or surety for
the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will
justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the
continuance of his life."' 56 Absent an insurable interest, the insur-
ance contract is void. 57
B. The Effect of the Cessation of the Insurable Interest
Although the Gambling Act required the policy holder to have
an insurable interest in the subject of the contract at the time of
contracting, the effect of the cessation of that interest on the validity
of the contract was unclear. In Dalby v. India and London Life-Assur-
ance Co. 58 the English Court of Common Pleas determined that the
cessation of the insurable interest had no effect on the insurance
policy.59 The Court reasoned that an alternative rule was unaccept-
able because of its potential for unjustly enriching insurance compa-
nies at the expense of policy holders. 60
52 Id. at 127 ("The abuses to which this arrangement might be subjected are appar-
ent. At one time it was almost a sport to wager that public figures would or would not
live for even such a short period of time as a few days. Persons in public life were thus
made the subjects of so-called life insurance contracts by people who were not even
acquainted with them.").
53 14 Geo. III, ch. 48. The Gambling Act was designed to prevent abuses that had
arisen under the existing laws of life insurance. J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 51,
at 126-27 (3d ed. 1974).
54 J. GREDIER & W. BEADLES, supra note 51, at 127. ("[TI]he requirement of an in-
surable interest as a safeguard against the possible misuse of life insurance was early
adopted, independently, in the United States. Sometimes it was enacted into statutory
law; sometimes it was expressed as case law, as a matter of public policy.").
55 Id
56 Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881) (invalidating assignment of insur-
ance policy to one without an insurable interest).
57 J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 51, at 140 ("If the insurance is to be paya-
ble to someone who has no insurable interest at the time the contract is completed, the
contract will be void.").
58 15 C.B. 365, 139 Eng. Rep. 465 (C.P. 1854).
59 Id at 390-91, 139 Eng. Rep. at 475-76.
60 Were the insurance policy holder's interest to be measured at the time of the
insured's death
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American courts ultimately accepted the Dalby rule that the de-
struction of the insurable interest in the insured did not affect the
right of a beneficiary to take the proceeds of an insurance policy. 6'
As a result, if one spouse was the beneficiary and policy holder of an
insurance policy on the life of the other spouse, a later divorce did
not affect the surviving former spouse's right to the proceeds of the
policy. 62 Similarly, if one spouse insured his own life and named the
other spouse as beneficiary of the policy, divorce did not affect the
insurable interest because every individual has an insurable interest
in his own life.63 Thus, divorce alone could not affect a beneficiary's
right to receive the proceeds of a former spouse's life insurance
policy.
C. Factors Affecting a Beneficiary's Right to Take the Proceeds
of a Former Spouse's Life Insurance Policy
Whether the beneficiary's interest is vested determines whether
the former-spouse beneficiary will receive the proceeds of the life
insurance policy. Where the beneficiary is irrevocable, he holds a
vested interest in the proceeds. 64 In such a case, the beneficiary will
receive the proceeds of the policy unless he voluntarily divests him-
self of his interest in that policy. 65
If the policy holder can change the policy beneficiaries, it is
more difficult to define a beneficiary's interest in the proceeds.
Courts variously have interpreted such a beneficiary's interest as
[i]t [would] no longer [be] a contract to pay a certain sum as the value of a
then-existing interest, in the event of death in consideration of a fixed
annuity calculated with reference to that sum; but a contract to pay,--
contrary to express words,-a varying sum, according to the alteration of
the value of that interest at the time of death ... ; and yet the ... pre-
mium to be paid, is fixed, calculated on the original fixed value, and is
unvarying ....
This seems to us so contrary to justice and fair dealing and common
honesty, that this construction cannot.., be put upon this section.
Id., 139 Eng. Rep. at 475-76 (emphasis in original).
61 See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 463 (1876)
(Joint life insurance policy payable to wife at ex-husband's death despite divorce on
grounds that "in ourjudgment a life policy, originally valid, does not cease to be so by
the cessation of the assured party's interest in the life insured.") (citing Dalby); Courtois
v. Grand Lodge of A.O.U.W., 135 Cal. 552, 67 P. 970 (1902) (wife entitled to policy
proceeds at husband's death despite intervening divorce) (citing Schaefer); see also 5 G.
COUCH, supra note 49, § 29:4, at 235 (termination of beneficiary spouse's insurable inter-
est upon divorce does not affect his or her right to recover policy proceeds).
62 See 5 G. COUCH, supra note 49, § 29:4, at 234.
63 J. MUNCH, LIFE INSURANCE IN ESTATE PLANNING, 6.1.2, at 112 (1981).
64 J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 51, at 145 (an irrevocable beneficiary has "a
vested right to the benefit payable at the death of the insured ... [that] cannot be re-




vested, subject to total divestment;66 an inchoate right;67 or a mere
expectancy. 68 Regardless of which definition a court uses, the bene-
,ficiary has essentially the same right: "[the beneficiary] has been
told 'I hereby give you the right to receive certain assets, to be deliv-
ered upon my death, unless I decide to give those assets to someone
else.' "69 One commentator has defined the differences in the char-
acterizations of this interest as '"mere nicet[ies] of language, com-
parable to using the right fork or spoon at the table.' "70
Insurance contracts generally prescribe whether and by what
method a policy holder can change the designated beneficiary. 71
Courts have held that the policy holder must substantially comply
with the prescribed method of change in order to change the benefi-
ciary. 72 To meet this substantial compliance requirement, the policy
owner must attempt to do everything possible to comply with the
change-of-beneficiary requirements. 73
Johnson v. New York Life Insurance Co. 74 represents one of the
more striking examples of the substantial compliance rule's opera-
tion. The life insurance policy in Johnson contained an endorsement
change-of-beneficiary clause, 75 which required the insured to notify
66 See, e.g., Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Colo. 178, 182-83, 138 P. 414,
416 (1913); Indiana Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 18-21, 101 N.E. 289,
292-93 (1913); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 454-55, 47 A.2d
340, 342-43 (1946);John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Heidrick, 135 N.J. Eq. 326, 328,
38 A.2d 442, 443 (Ch. 1944).
67 See, e.g., Shaw v. Board of Admin., 109 Cal. App. 2d 770, 774, 241 P.2d 635, 637
(1952); Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 619, 191 N.E. 250, 253 (1934).
68 See, e.g., Thorp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. 2d 770, 773, 264 P.2d 38, 40 (1953) (en
banc); McEwen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 Cal. App. 133, 138 (1919); Hicks v. North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co, 166 Iowa 532, 537, 147 N.W. 833, 885 (1914); Life Ins. Co. of
N. Am. v.Jackson, 475 A.2d 1150, 1151 (Me. 1984).
69 Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional Law: The Ideology of
the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1578 (1982).
70 Langbein, supra note 7, at 1128 n.81 (quotingJ. APPLEMAN &J. APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 911, at 475 (1966)).
71 The three common methods by which the policy holder can change the benefici-
ary are the endorsement method, the filing method, and the endorsement-at-insurer's-
option method. The endorsement method requires the policy holder to send written
notification of the change to the insurance company's home office. The change is valid
as soon as the company endorses it onto the policy. The filing method requires the
policy holder only to file a written request of change with the company. The endorse-
ment-at-insurer's-option method provides that ordinarily a change may be made merely
by the filing method, but that the company reserves the right to require endorsement if
it so desires. J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 51, at 400-01.
72 See id. at 401-03 (if insured has done everything in his power to comply with
policy procedures, change of beneficiary ordinarily will be given effect).
73 Id. at 402.
74 56 Colo. 178, 138 P. 414 (1913).
75 For a discussion of the types of change of change of beneficiary provisions, see
supra note 70.
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the company in writing of any change of beneficiary.76 The insured
initially had named his mother as the beneficiary, but after marriage
he wanted to change this designation to his wife. To that end, he
delivered the actual policy to his wife, and she paid several of the
premiums.
In attempting to excuse the insured's failure to comply with the
contractual method of changing beneficiaries, his wife presented ev-
idence that:
he resided about 50 miles from [the home office], and made a trip
for the purpose of making application at the office of the company
... to have plaintiff designated as the beneficiary; that he was ig-
norant of the manner and procedure required to be taken for the
purpose of effecting such change; that he endeavored to find the
agent through whom the policy was effected; that he was unable to
do so; that he then attempted to transact the matter himself, but
found the offices of the company closed; that he was a laboring
man, a miner, a poor person, and a foreigner, and unable to either
read or write the English language, except meagerly .... 77
Despite the extreme circumstances of this case, the court held the
attempted change of beneficiary ineffective. The insured simply had
not tried hard enough to comply with the contract and therefore
had failed to satisfy the substantial compliance requirement.78
The substantial compliance requirement is the major reason for
the different effects of divorce on a will and on a life insurance pol-
icy. In the law of wills courts fashioned the doctrine of revocation
by divorce because the testator's intent ostensibly controls the result
in a will case.79 No such doctrine of presumed intent is possible in
the case of insurance policies because the insurance contract gov-
erns the beneficiary designation.80 Thus, in the paradigmatic revo-
cation-by-divorce case, in which divorce is coupled with a property
settlement, unless the insured at least substantially complies with his
life insurance policy's change-of-beneficiary requirements, his for-
mer spouse will recover the proceeds of the policy upon his death. 81
76 56 Colo. at 179-80, 138 P. at 415.
77 Id. at 181, 138 P. at 415.
78 The complaint fail[ed] to allege a sufficient attempt on the part of the
insured to make a change of the beneficiary in the manner provided, or
that he was prevented from doing so by the happening of that over which
he had no control. What it allege[d] ... in the way of an excuse was pure
neglect upon his part, and nothing more.
Id. at 184, 138 P. at 416.
79 See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
80 One reason for the different treatment is that the insurance company must know
to whom it is obligated to pay the proceeds of the insurance policy. For criticism of this
reason for the different treatment, see infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
81 See Shaw v. Board of Admin., 109 Cal. App. 2d 770, 776-77, 241 P.2d 635, 638-
39 (1952) (wife entitled to proceeds of former husband's death benefit policy despite
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D. The Property Settlement as a Waiver of the Beneficiary's
Interest in an Insurance Policy
Contract law prevented courts from recognizing implied revo-
cation by divorce of life insurance policy beneficiary designations.
The courts did, however, fashion a limited revocation-by-divorce
doctrine using the concept of waiver.8 2 The California Supreme
Court first articulated this doctrine in Grimm v. Gimm.83 The court
held that when a designated beneficiary entered a contract with the
insured in which he surrendered his interest in the policy, he was
equitably estopped from claiming the proceeds.8 4
In Grimm a married couple had entered into a property agree-
ment in 1939 which divided their community property. Under the
terms of the agreement, a life insurance policy on the husband's life
naming the wife as beneficiary became the husband's sole prop-
erty.8 5 Two years later the couple obtained a divorce. Mr. Grimm
died in 1943 without having changed the beneficiary designation.
Judge Traynor noted the general rule that an ex-wife was enti-
tled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of her for-
mer spouse if she remained the named beneficiary.8 6 He explained,
however, that because equity would enforce the release of an expec-
tancy,8 7 a beneficiary who had surrendered his interest in the pro-
ceeds could not receive those proceeds regardless of the policy's
beneficiary designation.88 The court's determination of whether a
having accepted $400 by divorce decree in lieu of interest in community property); Cox
v. Employers Life Ins. Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 12, 19, 322 N.E.2d 555, 560 (1975) (Where
life insurance policy required that to change beneficiary designation of change must be
in writing and must be filed with company, "The property settlement agreement in this
case in no way complies with this requirement and, therefore, would be ineffective to
change the beneficiary of the insurance policy .. "); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.Jackson,
475 A.2d 1150, 1151 (Me. 1984) ("The mere fact that the named beneficiary has been
divorced from the insured does not affect the beneficiary's rights to the insurance pro-
ceeds."); Bowers v. Bowers, 637 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tenn. 1982) (property settlement
held to have "no force and effect whatever upon the life insurance policy and neither the
agreement nor the divorce terminated wife's status as named beneficiary in the policy or
her right to receive the proceeds.").
82 A waiver is "the intentional and voluntary giving up of a known privilege or
right." J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 51, at 291.
83 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945).
84 Id. at 175-76, 157 P.2d at 842-43.
85 The property settlement agreement provided: 'The parties hereto do mutually
covenant and agree that this agreement is ... a complete property settlement between
the parties hereto, and that it compromises ... all claims arising ... by reason of the
marriage of the parties hereto.'" Id. at 177-78, 157 P.2d at 843-44. The agreement
specifically included the life insurance policy as marital property. Id. at 178, 157 P.2d at
844.
86 ide at 177, 157 P.2d at 843.
87 Id. at 176, 157 P.2d at 843 ("An assignment or release of an expectancy becomes
enforceable in equity when the expectancy has developed into a right.").
88 Id. at 175, 157 P.2d at 842 ("She would not be entitled to such proceeds, how-
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beneficiary surrendered his interest would depend on the parties'
intent as reflected in their property settlement.
The court in Grimm determined that the beneficiary had not in-
tended to waive her right to the policy proceeds.8 9 Subsequent
courts have used the Grimm court's statement that a beneficiary can
contractually surrender his rights to an expectancy to create a quasi-
revocation-by-divorce doctrine for insurance policies. The majority
of courts today hold that when a divorce decree specifically men-
tions a life insurance policy (other than to require the insured to
name a specific beneficiary), the spouse beneficiary has waived his
expectancy interest in the proceeds. 90
E. A Comparison of the Operation of Revocation By Divorce
in Wills and Waiver by Agreement in Life Insurance
Policies
State legislatures almost universally have determined that di-
vorce should revoke any gift to the testator's former spouse in his
previously executed will. 9 ' Absent specific reference to an insur-
ance policy in the divorce decree, however, an ex-spouse can receive
the proceeds of a life insurance policy. 92
This division in the laws respecting wills and life insurance poli-
cies can lead to anomalous results. For example, suppose a man
ever, if the parties agreed that no rights were to accrue to her, even though she re-
mained the beneficiary at the time of the husband's death.").
89 Id. at 179, 157 P.2d at 844 ("The express reference in the agreement to the right
of the husband to change the beneficiary indicates that there was no immediate change
and that the wife would remain the beneficiary... unless the husband exercised his right
to change the beneficiary.").
90 See, e.g., Brewer v. Brewer, 239 Ark. 614, 390 S.W.2d 630 (1965) (property settle-
ment in which wife transferred and released her interest in husband's life insurance and
which gave husband right to change beneficiaries held to have changed beneficiary);
Phillips v. Pelton, 10 Ohio St. 3d 52, 53, 461 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1984) (exception to
general rule that divorce does not revoke right of beneficiary to take policy exists "where
the terms of a separation agreement.. . 'plainly indicate' the elimination of the named
beneficiary from all rights to the life insurance proceeds"); Beckham v. Beckham, 672
S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (where husband purchases insurance policies and
designates wife as beneficiary, later divorces wife and is awarded policies, and dies
shortly after divorce without having changed beneficiaries, intent of insured rather than
policies determines the beneficiaries.). See generally Annotation, Property Settlement Agree-
ment as Affecting Divorced Spouse's Right to Recover as Named Beneficiary Under Former Spouses
Life Insurance Policy, 31 A.L.R.4th 59 (1984). But see Lewis v. Lewis, 693 S.W.2d 672
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (divorce decree in which wife gave up rights to husband's life in-
surance did not affect ex-wife's designation as beneficiary; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wad-
sworth, 102 Wash. 2d 652, 689 P.2d 46 (1984) (divorce decree which conveyed to
husband all life insurance policies insuring his life held to waive only wife's present own-
ership interest, not expectancy interest as beneficiary).
91 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
92 Michigan is the only exception to this rule. See MicH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 552.101 (West Supp. 1987). For text of the statute, see infra note 139.
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simultaneously executes a will leaving an estate worth $50,000 to his
wife and purchases a $500,000 life insurance policy naming her the
primary beneficiary. The couple then divorces without including
the life insurance policy in their property settlement. The husband
dies without changing either the will or the life insurance beneficiary
designation. The divorce would revoke the $50,000 gift to the for-
mer wife on the presumption that "the last thing one of the parties
[would wish] is to have an earlier will carried out giving everything
to a former spouse." 93  The same spouse would receive the
$500,000 in insurance proceeds, however, on the presumption that
" 'if the insured had wished to substitute another person or his es-
tate as beneficiary following the divorce, he would have at least at-
tempted to effect a change with the insurer or included a provision
in the property settlement.' "94 Such inconsistent presumptions
make sense only if people recognize the differences between wills
and life insurance policies. In fact, people do not recognize these
differences and think of life insurance as a pure will substitute.
III
THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE OF WILLS AND LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES
A. Probate Avoidance as a Motive for Purchasing Life
Insurance
One of the key advantages offered by life insurance is that the
proceeds pass to the beneficiary without the necessity of probate. 95
The public commonly believes "that succession via probate runs di-
rectly against such usually desired objectives as privacy in regard to
family property matters, avoidance of delay in transmission at death
and avoidance of artificial non-liquidity following death."' 96 In addi-
tion, people view probate as a means of enriching lawyers at the
expense of beneficiaries. 97
93 Young, supra note 3, at 10.
94 Cox v. Employers Life Ins. Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 12, 19, 322 N.E.2d 555, 559
(1975) (quoting O'Toole v. Central Laborers' Pension & Welfare Funds, 12 Ill. App. 3d
995, 997, 299 N.E.2d 392, 394 (1973)).
95 SeeJ. DUKMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 315-17.
96 Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44 IND.
LJ. 191, 194 (1968); see alsoJ. MUNCH, supra note 63, 8.1, at 160 (Making insurance
proceeds payable to the estate of the insured "is undesirable, if for no other reason than
because it subjects the proceeds to probate. The estate is enlarged . . .', attorney and
executor's fees are increased, and in some states, the costs of the probate process are
increased.").
97 See Meyers, Probing the Source of Probate Pains, Wall St. J., May 14, 1968, at 18, col.
3 ("[A] lot of beneficiaries believe . . . that they have been gypped by outrageous
overcharging by lawyers probating estates. It isn't too hard to find someone with what
he considers a very sad story about legal fees.").
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The practical similarities between wills and life insurance poli-
cies render life insurance an easy will substitute for those who wish
to avoid probate. Indeed, the two most basic requirements for a
will-that it be revocable until the death of the maker, and that it
vest no enforceable property right in the beneficiary until that
time 9 8-are both characteristics of life insurance policies that allow
a change of beneficiary. 99
Considering the public's desire to avoid probate 00 and the sim-
ilarities between a life insurance policy and a will,10 ' a life insurance
policy is best characterized as a "nonprobate will."' 1 2 Indeed, the
reason people cite most often for purchasing life insurance is to pro-
vide financial protection for their families in case they die prema-
turely.1 03 The characterization of life insurance as a nonprobate will
is supported further when one considers that, in most cases, people
understand almost nothing about their insurance contracts.
B. Consumer Ignorance of Insurance Contracts
An overwhelming number of Americans have some form of life
insurance,0 4 yet Americans as a whole remain remarkably ignorant
of the contractual rights and duties contained in their policies. 10 5
This ignorance probably results from insurance contract complexity
and consumer apathy.' 0 6 Whatever the cause of this ignorance, it is
98 Langbein, supra note 7, at 1110 (interests of beneficiaries do not exist until in-
sured's death); Alexander, supra note 69, at 1571 (life insurance beneficiary's interest in
proceeds of policy is "vulnerable to [the policy holder's] legally recognized power of
termination").
99 See Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 175-76, 157 P.2d 841, 842 (1945) ("The
interest of a beneficiary designated by an insured who has the right to change the benefi-
ciary is, like that of a legatee under a will, a mere expectancy of a gift at the time of the
insured's death."); Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d 906, 910 (Utah
1981) (quoting Grimm); Langbein, supra note 7, at 1110 ("We say that a will is revocable
until the death of the testator and that the interests of the devisees are ... nonexistent
until the testator's death. Unless specifically restricted by contract, the life insurance
beneficiary designations operates identically.") (footnote omitted).
100 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
102 See Langbein, supra note 7, at 1137; see also I.R.C. § 2042 (1982) (proceeds of life
insurance policies payable to third parties included in decedent's gross estate if, at time
of death, decedent possessed any incident of ownership).
103 AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1986 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 8 (1984); see
also AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, MONITORING ATTITUDES OF THE PUBLIC 27 (1984)
[hereinafter M.A.P. 1984] (In 1984, 65% of people polled stated that they agreed with
statement, "Everything considered, life insurance is the best way of protecting one's
family financially against the premature death of the breadwinner.").
104 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
105 See V. ZELIZER, MORALES AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES 21-22 (1979) (most policy holders are ignorant about their own poli-
cies and about life insurance in general).
106 Id.; see also J. BELTH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMERS' HANDBOOK 178-87 (1973)
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a fact that most insureds do not understand the exact nature of their
relationship with the insurance company. 10 7 Given this consumer
ignorance, it is hard to believe that people choose to purchase a life
insurance policy because of its contractual features.
1. Ignorance Resulting From Contract Complexity
Life insurance contracts are tremendously complex. 1 0 8 Indeed
a recent study concluded that insurance contracts were less under-
standable than both the Bible and Einstein's theory of relativity. 10 9
Studies since 1968 have shown that only between nine and eleven
percent of people surveyed believed that they were "very well in-
formed" about life insurance."t 0 Even more telling is that only
twenty percent of people surveyed in 1984 believed that they under-
stood the terms and provisions of their life insurance policies "very
well." 11
Unfortunately, in most cases insurance agents cannot explain
policy complexities to life insurance purchasers. Insurance agents'
lack of policy knowledge is a result of the great weight that insur-
ance companies accord training agents in sales techniques. 1 2 Be-
cause sales are insurance companies' first priority, "many companies
fail to educate their [agents] to the technicalities of life insur-
ance.""u 3 Consumers thus remain unaware of the specific terms of
their contracts, and their primary source of information, their agent,
is unable to education them.
("Ignorance, complexity and apathy are the three words that best characterize the insur-
ance market." Id. at 178.).
107 See infra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
108 See J. BELTH, supra note 106, at 178; J. GOLLIN, PAY Now, DIE LATER 5 (1966)
("[T]he life insurance industry has long chosen to conduct its affairs is a strange jargon,
a kind of Mandarin, that mystifies and alienates everybody who has to cope with it."); see
also Comment, Life Insurance-Divorce Property Settlements-Relative Rights of Beneficiaries-
New Jersey's Inflexible Approach, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 189, 197-98 (1970) ("Due to the intri-
cate and sometimes confusing language used in many life insurance policies, insureds
often fail to comprehend the full impact of most policy provisions.").
109 See V. ZELIZER, supra note 105, at 22.
110 M.A.P. 1984, supra note 103, at 28. Other studies have show that people are not
well informed about their policies. See INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, THE M.A.P. RE-
PORT 20 (1973) [hereinafter M.A.P. 1973) ("[A] sampling of the public was tested on
their life insurance knowledge, and the results confirmed that people's perceptions of
their lack of knowledge were accurate.").
11 M.A.P. 1984, supra note 103, at 29.
112 J. BELTH, A REPORT ON LIFE INSURANCE 148 (1967).
113 Id.; see also N. DACEY, WHAT'S WRONG WITH YOUR LIFE INSURANCE 355-56 (1963)
(Insurance industry "is interested only in a man with a professional knowledge of how to
sell [life insurance]. They don't want salesmen to know what insurance is. The industry's
slogan is "Just do as we tell you .... Don't tell them anything about the policy. Just talk
generalities.' ") (emphasis in original).
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2. Consumer Ignorance Resulting From Consumer Apathy
Insureds also are largely ignorant of their policies' terms be-
cause of their own apathy.1 14 Although people generally believe
that they should have some form of life insurance, 115 most people
do not feel that they should learn more about their policies.' 1 6 Apa-
thy toward life insurance stems from two factors. First, because
people are averse to discussing their own death they fail to seek in-
formation regarding the different aspects of their policies. 1 7 Sec-
ond, because insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, 1 8
insureds have no choice as to the terms of the contract. Conse-
quently, most people accept what the agent tells them without actu-
ally reading the contract for themselves. 119
Courts have balked at applying revocation by divorce to life in-
surance policies because these policies are governed by contract
law. Yet in almost all cases insureds neither understand nor care
about any of the contractual aspects of their policies. It is necessary,
therefore, to study other possible justifications for distinguishing
life insurance policies and wills.
IV
POSSIBLE REASONS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN WILLS
AND LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES WHEN APPLYING
REVOCATION BY DIVORCE
Courts have failed to advance reasons for distinguishing be-
tween applying revocation by divorce to wills and applying it to life
114 SeeJ. BELTH, supra note 106, at 181 ("Apathy in the life insurance market is wide-
spread .... People would rather spend their leisure time discussing automobiles, sports,
politics, social problems, or the state of the economy."); V. ZELIZER, supra note 105, at
22 (people prefer to remain ignorant about life insurance).
115 See M.A.P. 1984, supra note 103, at 27 (When given statement, "Most people
should have some form of life insurance coverage," in the years 1980-1984, between
77% and 80%5 of people surveyed stated that they agreed. Only between 6% and 9%o
disagreed.).
116 See V. ZELIZER, supra note 105, at 22 ("[R]ecent data confirm consumers' igno-
rance of the various policies available, the various options, the provisions in the con-
tracts and price variations.") (citing LIFE INSURANCE AGENCY MANAGEMENT ASS'N, LIFE
INSURANCE CONSUMERS 25 (1973)).
117 See J. BELTH, supra note 106, at 181-82 ("[An] important effect of apathy on the
life insurance market is that it tends to perpetuate ignorance. When people are not
interested in discussing life insurance, they do not find out how it operates or how it can
be useful to them.").
118 See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 295 (1982) (Contract of adhesion is
standard form contract that is "a take-it-or-leave-it proposition ... under which the only
alternative to complete adherence is outright rejection.") (footnote omitted).
119 See V. ZELIZER, supra note 105, at 23 n.* ("Another reason why people did not
read their insurance policies is that they are contracts of 'adhesion,' unilaterally drafted
by one of the parties involved in the contractual relationship. The insured merely ad-
heres to it with little choice as to its terms.").
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insurance policies. While there are a number of possible reasons for
such a distinction, none provides a logical basis for the different
treatment. Courts should therefore extend the doctrine of revoca-
tion by divorce to life insurance policies.
A. Protection of the Insured's Intent
One possible reason why courts have refused to extend revoca-
tion by divorce to life insurance policies is to protect the policy
holder's expressed intent. Courts presume that the insured did not
intend to remove his spouse as beneficiary of his life insurance pol-
icy after divorce. Indeed, courts commonly declare that the insured
knew whom he had named as beneficiary, that "it was in his power
to change that designation [and that] [h]e chose not to do so even
though time and opportunity permitted."1 20 Therefore, the reason-
ing goes, the policy holder intended his former spouse to receive
the insurance proceeds upon his death. The logic of revocation-by-
divorce statutes, however, contradicts this presumption1 2 unless
people are more likely to change their life insurance than their will.
Such a greater likelihood of change for life insurance policies is
doubtful for two reasons. First, because of the substantial compli-
ance requirement it may be more difficult to change the beneficiary
of a life insurance policy than to make a similar change in a will.1 22
For example, in states recognizing holographic wills, 123 a testator
can change the beneficiary in a will merely by writing out a ho-
lographic codicil.' 24 In contrast, such a written expression of intent
would fail to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. 125
In addition, a person is as likely to neglect to change the benefi-
120 Girard v. Pardun, 318 N.W.2d 137, 140 (S.D. 1982); accord Bowers v. Bowers,
637 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tenn. 1982).
121 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
122 For a discussion of the substantial compliance requirement, see supra notes 71-78
and accompanying text.
123 A holographic will is a will that is handwritten by the testator. SeeJ. DUKMINIER &
J. JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 230. The states that recognize holographic wills are:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 230 n.28.
124 See, e.g., In re Estate of Morris, 15 Ariz. App. 378, 381, 488 P.2d 1015, 1018
(1971) ("We are satisfied that under the Arizona statutes a holograph and a witnessed
will are of equal formality, and that the holographic codicil here effectively modified the
witnessed will."); Welch v. Straach, 531 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 1975) (holographic will
giving wife fee simple estate in homestead modified to give life estate by holographic
codicil stating "this homestead shall remain in her possession as long as she live").
125 See, e.g., Allen v. First Nat'l Bank, 261 Ark. 230, 547 S.W.2d 118 (1977) (en banc)
(written and signed statement that "I hereby change the beneficiaries of all those life
insurance policies ... mentioned above" held not effective because it failed to comply
with contractual method of change); see also supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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ciary of a life insurance policy as to neglect to change a will. Both
changes require the person to deal with the inevitability of death,
yet his natural reluctance to accept this inevitability 26 may cause
him to neglect both the changes in his will and in his insurance pol-
icy. The insured does not demonstrate his intent to have the pro-
ceeds pass to his former spouse by failing to change the designated
beneficiary any more than a testator's failure to change his will dem-
onstrates his intent to convey his estate to his former spouse. 127 In-
deed, because it is a "generally accepted proposition that most
policy holders rarely look at their policies,"' 28 implying an insured's
intent from his inaction with respect to his policy would seem to
depart from reality. Courts therefore cannot justify the current
treatment of life insurance policies as a means of protecting the in-
sured's intent.
B. Protection of the Beneficiary
A second possible reason why courts have refused to extend
revocation by divorce to life insurance policies is that they are con-
cerned with protecting the named beneficiaries. 129 This concern,
however, does not justify treating an insurance contract differently
from a will because a will and a life insurance policy create identical
property interests.130
Courts should not protect the former-spouse beneficiary in any
event. Insurance law has been shaped by courts' desires to avoid
unjust enrichment.' 3 1 Yet allowing the former spouse to take the
life insurance proceeds contrary to the insured's intent1 32 unjustly
enriches the former spouse at the expense of the true objects of the
insured's bounty.13 3 Courts, therefore, cannot justify their refusal
to extend revocation by divorce to insurance policies by claiming
this refusal protects the designated beneficiary of the policy.
C. Protection of the Life Insurance Companies
A third possible reason courts treat life insurance policies dif-
ferently than wills is to protect insurance companies from wrongful
126 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
128 J. BELTH, supra note 112, at 155; see also Comment, supra note 108, at 198 ("Un-
questionably, many insureds also take the policy for granted, only concerning them-
selves with the payment of premiums.).
129 An insurance contract does create some kind of a property interest in the benefi-
ciary. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 17-19 & 38-50 and accompanying text.
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disbursement liability. The strict manner in which courts enforce
the substantial compliance rule 134 supports this notion. The
change-of-beneficiary provisions in insurance contracts are
designed to protect insurance companies from wrongful disburse-
ment liability, 135 making it easy for them to determine a policy's
proper beneficiary. The substantial compliance rule reifies this pro-
tection by allowing companies to rely on their beneficiary
determinations.
Courts' refusals to extend revocation by divorce to insurance
policies similarly protects insurance companies from wrongful dis-
bursements by allowing them to rely on their beneficiary determina-
tions. Insurance companies do not need this type of protection,
however, for two reasons. First, insurance companies can rely on
interpleader to avoid liability. 136 Interpleader allows the insurance
company to submit to any court of competent jurisdiction the ques-
tion of who among all individuals claiming an interest in the policy
proceeds is entitled to receive those proceeds. 137 Thus an insurance
company can avoid potential liability for wrongful disbursement
through a single judicial proceeding.'3 8
Second, insurance companies can protect themselves by assur-
ing that the insured wants the named beneficiary to receive the pol-
icy proceeds. The insurance company could do that by including a
statement of the current beneficiaries of the policy with the in-
sured's premium bill for the insured to sign and return. By having
the insured sign and return such a statement, the company could be
confident that the insured's beneficiary designation was a true ex-
pression of his intent. Courts, therefore, cannot justify their refusal
to extend revocation by divorce to insurance policies by claiming
the current distinction is necessary to protect insurance companies.
134 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
135 Comment, supra note 108, at 198 ("the formal policy requirements for changing
beneficiaries were designed to protect the insurer from wrongful disbursement").
136 J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 51, at 495 ("The remedy of interpleader
permits any person, corporation, or association holding money or property belonging to
someone else to submit to a court the question of who is rightfully entitled to it. When-
ever two or more persons claim the same property and the holder cannot decide be-
tween or among them, he may file a bill of interpleader in a court, deposit the money
with it, and the court will decide among the claimants.").
'37 Id.
138 See id. at 496 (after the insurance company has filed bill of interpleader a "final
court decision settles the question, and the company is discharged of all further
liability").
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A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A. Reverse the Current Nonrevocation Rule For Life
Insurance Policies
The presumption of the revocation-by-divorce statutes, that
revocation of a will reflects the testator's true intent, applies equally
to life insurance policies. Thus, the current approach gives effect to
the decedent's intent in distributing assets transferred under a will
but frustrates the decedent's intent in distributing assets transferred
by a life insurance policy.
To correct the current inconsistency in treatment of asset trans-
fers to a former spouse at death, states should follow Michigan's
lead and enact statutes providing that divorce alone revokes any
right a former spouse has to the proceeds of a previously executed
life insurance policy.' 3 9 These statutes also would provide certainty
in the outcome of each former-spouse beneficiary case. As a result
of this certainty former spouses would bring fewer cases question-
ing whether the specific words in any given property settlement
waived their rights to life insurance policy proceeds.' 40
Absent legislative action, courts should nevertheless apply rev-
139 See MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 552.101(2) (West Supp. 1987). The statute pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
Each judgment of divorce orjudgment of separate maintenance shall
determine all rights of the wife in and to the proceeds of any policy or
contract of life insurance, endowment, or annuity upon the life of the
husband in which the wife was named or designated as beneficiary, or to
which the wife became entitled by assignment or change of beneficiary
during the marriage or in anticipation of marriage. If the judgment of
divorce or judgment of separate maintenance does not determine the
rights of the wife in and to a policy of life insurance, endowment or annu-
ity, the policy shall be payable to the estate of the husband or to the
named beneficiary if the husband so designates. However, the company
issuing the policy shall be discharged of all liability on the policy by pay-
ment of its proceeds in accordance with the terms of the policy, unless
before the payment the company receives written notice, by or on behalf
of the insured or the estate of the insured or 1 of the heirs of the insured,
or any other person having an interest in the policy, of a claim under the
policy and the divorce.
140 For cases involving the interpretation of various property settlements, see, e.g.,
Allen v. First Nat'l Bank, 261 Ark. 230, 547 S.W.2d 118 (1977) (en banc) (no waiver by
spouse where property settlement incorporated into divorce did not specifically mention
life insurance policies at issue); Thorp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. 2d 770, 264 P.2d 38 (1953)
(en banc) (property settlement that mentioned life insurance policy in question held to
waive former spouse's rights to policy); Maxwell v. Britt, 171 Ga. App. 230, 319 S.E.2d
88 (1984) (where property agreement did not mention insurance policies, no waiver by
former spouse); Redd v. Brooke, 96 Nev. 9, 604 P.2d 360 (1980) (no waiver where prop-
erty agreement did not state that each party intended to give up rights to expectancy in
policy); Bersch v. VanKleeck, 112 Wis. 2d 594, 334 N.W.2d 114 (1983) (no waiver where
property agreement specifically awards each party their respective insurance policies but
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ocation by divorce to insurance policies. Current laws concerning
the effect of divorce on life insurance policies reflect an outmoded
characterization of those policies. 14 1 Courts should recognize the
fact that life insurance is nothing more than a will substitute 142 and
extend the treatment of wills to the area of life insurance.143
In applying revocation by divorce to life insurance, courts
should try to minimize the insurance company's potential liability
for wrongful disbursement. 144 The courts should require a com-
pany to interplead opposing parties if it knows of the insured's di-
vorce. Absent such information on the part of the insurance
company, courts should relieve the company from further
liability. 145
CONCLUSION
The current distinction between the effect of divorce on wills
and on life insurance policies is not logically justifiable. The oddest
aspect of this distinction is that when discussing the effect of a di-
vorce on a life insurance policy courts believe they are "under no
obligation to mention, much less reconcile, the contrary rule and
rationale of the law of wills.' 146 The fact is, most people think of
life insurance policies in the same manner as wills 147 and do not
understand that a complicated set of legal rules attaches to a life
insurance policy. 148
Perhaps the will/life insurance distinction was valid at one
time. 149 This distinction, however, is not valid today. Legislatures
should follow Michigan's lead and provide that unless otherwise or-
did not specifically denote how beneficiaries interest was to be terminated). For a dis-
cussion of the use of waiver, see supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
142 See Langbein, supra note 7, at 1136-37 ("Transferors use will substitutes to avoid
probate, not to avoid the subsidiary law of wills. The subsidiary rules are the product of
centuries of legal experience in attempting to discern transferor's wishes and suppress
litigation. These rules should be treated as presumptively correct for will substitutes as
well as for wills."); supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
143 Where a legal rule diverges from reality, courts have a duty to exercise their
function of common law formulation. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES 164 (1982) ("What, then, is the common law function to be exercised by
courts today? It is no more and no less than the critical task of deciding when a retentionist or a
revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an eisting statutory or common law rule. It is the judg-
mental function... of deciding when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of phase with
the whole legal framework ....") (emphasis in original).
144 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
145 For an example of how this limitation of liability for insurers may be formulated,
see MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 552.101 (West Supp. 1987).
146 Langbein, supra note 7, at 1136.
147 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
149 SeeJ. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 51, at 425.
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dered by a divorce decree, life insurance proceeds shall be payable
to the secondary beneficiary or, absent a secondary beneficiary, to
the insured's estate.150 If state legislatures fail to adopt such stat-
utes, courts should recognize the practical similarity between wills
and life insurance policies and apply the doctrine of revocation by
divorce to life insurance policies.
Alan S. Wilmit
150 See supra note 139.
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